Getting to Yes: Power, Resistance, and Hardball Tactics • Olimp Run

In Part 1 I wrote about principled negotiation: separate people from the problem, focus on interests (not positions), invent options for mutual gain, and insist on objective criteria — within the Analysis → Planning → Discussion loop.

Part 2 moves into what Fisher & Ury treat as the “under pressure” reality:

what to do when the other side is stronger (Power / BATNA)
what to do when they refuse to play (Resistance / negotiation jujitsu)
what to do when they use dirty tricks (Hardball tactics)

Power: what to do when they are stronger (BATNA)

Fisher & Ury are unusually honest: no method guarantees success if the other side holds all the cards.

What any negotiation method can do is limited to two outcomes:

Protect you from accepting an agreement you should reject.
Help you use all your resources so any agreement serves your interests as well as possible.

That protection and leverage comes from one concept: BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement).

The trap: “closing a deal” at any cost

When the other side is stronger, the danger is psychological: you start treating “getting to agreement” as the win — even if the agreement is bad.

The book’s baseline is different:

You negotiate to achieve something better than what you could get without negotiating.

So the true comparison is never “their demand vs my demand.”
It’s always: this deal vs my BATNA.

Bottom line is a costly substitute

A common self-protection tactic is setting a bottom line (a number you “won’t go below”).

Fisher & Ury point out why this is dangerous:

A bottom line is a position. It’s rigid by nature and it narrows creativity.
It can be set wrong (too high / too low), and once you commit to it you may ignore better structures or options.
It pulls you back into the very positional bargaining the book tries to escape.

BATNA is not a bottom line

A BATNA is not a number. It’s a plan: what you will actually do if there is no deal.

This one shift gives you a clean decision rule:

Accept an agreement only if it is better than your BATNA.

If you don’t know your BATNA, you negotiate with your eyes closed.

Why lack of BATNA makes you irrational

Without a clear BATNA, people predictably make bad calls:

Over-optimism: imagining “many options” without costing time, stress, uncertainty, and friction (e.g., legal processes).
Double-counting alternatives: mentally treating multiple alternatives as if you could have them all at once, forgetting you can pick only one.
Over-pessimism (the worst): assuming you have no alternatives and accepting a bad deal just to stop discomfort.

BATNA stabilizes you psychologically: it prevents “closure addiction.”

A “fuse” (early warning)

Another useful safeguard is to define an “acceptable but not great” agreement — something clearly better than BATNA, even if far from ideal.

This acts as an early warning signal: when proposed terms fall below that threshold, the negotiation is drifting into bad-deal territory.

What power really is

Negotiation power is not primarily money, status, or intimidation.

It depends on how attractive no deal is for each side.

That’s why a wealthy outsider can be weak if they don’t understand the context, while a poorer party can be strong if they can walk away and sell/act elsewhere.

How to build BATNA (three-step method)

Treat BATNA like engineering, not like a slogan:

Invent: list every plausible action you can take if no agreement is reached.
Improve: develop the most promising options into practical plans (cost, time, friction, risk).
Choose: select one provisional best option — your current BATNA.

Then improve it again. Every improvement to BATNA increases leverage without escalating conflict.

Should you reveal your BATNA?

Only if it helps:

If your BATNA is strong, revealing it (or credibly signaling it) can prevent pressure tactics and anchor expectations.
If your BATNA is weak, broadcasting it invites exploitation.

Also: always map their BATNA. If you don’t understand what they can do instead, you don’t understand what motivates them — or what they fear.

Takeaway

If the other side has “big guns,” you don’t want a shootout.

BATNA lets you avoid that trap:

It protects you from accepting a deal you should reject.
It gives you a real baseline for evaluating proposals.
It turns “power” from intimidation into a decision rule: deal vs BATNA.

Resistance: when they won’t play (negotiation jujitsu)

Sometimes the other side simply refuses the “principled” game.

They announce a hard position. They attack your proposal. They attack you. And the instinctive response is predictable: defend, counterattack, dig in — and slide right back into positional bargaining.

Fisher & Ury outline three strategies for this situation:

Keep focusing on merits, not positions. The method can be contagious: interests, options, and criteria often pull the conversation toward problem-solving.
If that fails, use negotiation jujitsu: neutralize the “pushes” of positional bargaining and redirect them toward merits.
If that still fails, bring in a third party and use a mediated approach: the one-text procedure.

Part 1 already covered the first strategy (the method itself). What follows is the operational layer: how to respond when the other side tries to drag you into a wrestling match.

The core idea: don’t meet force with force

Negotiation jujitsu is counterintuitive because it asks you to do the opposite of what feels “strong”:

If they demand you accept their position, you don’t attack it.
If they criticize your proposal, you don’t defend it.
If they attack you, you don’t counterattack.

Instead, you “step aside,” let the force pass, and redirect it to the problem:

interests,
options for mutual gain,
objective criteria.

It sounds passive on paper. It isn’t. It’s active reframing.

The three pushes — and how to redirect each one

Fisher & Ury describe three common maneuvers:

1) They demand you accept their position

Your job is not to accept or reject it immediately. Your job is to look behind it.

Treat the position as a data point and probe for the underlying interests:

“What leads you to that number?”
“What problem is this solving for you?”
“What constraints are you working under?”
“Why is this important?”

You’re implicitly saying: I’m not negotiating willpower. I’m negotiating reality.

2) They attack your ideas

The trap is defending your proposal as if it were your identity. Instead, ask them to make their critique useful:

“What exactly is wrong with it?”
“Which important concerns does this fail to address?”
“What would you change?”

An even stronger move is asking for advice:

“If you were in my position, what would you do?”

This reframes their energy from “attack” into “design.”

3) They attack you

Personal attacks are usually an attempt to trigger a reaction and shift the game to ego.

The move here is to turn the attack into a process problem:

let them vent,
show you heard them (without agreeing),
then redirect to the issue at hand.

The goal is not to “win” the interpersonal exchange. The goal is to pull the conversation back to solvable ground.

Questions beat statements (and silence beats nonsense)

A key execution rule: use questions, not assertions.

Statements create resistance (“No.”). Questions force thinking and create ownership.

And when an answer is weak or evasive, the most effective tool is often silence. Ask a clear question, then wait.

People are uncomfortable in the gap — especially when they are not confident in their justification. Filling the silence for them (by adding more questions or commentary) often rescues them from the hook.

Sometimes the most effective negotiation move is: say nothing.

When even jujitsu fails: the one-text procedure

If the other side cannot or will not engage in interests/options/criteria, Fisher & Ury suggest bringing in a third party and using a one-text process.

The logic is simple: a mediator can often separate people from the problem more easily than either party can alone.

The procedure works like iterative product design:

The third party asks both sides “why?” questions — not to collect positions, but to surface interests and constraints.
The third party drafts a single proposed agreement text.
Each side critiques it; the mediator translates critiques into interests and constraints, then revises.
Repeat until the mediator can credibly say: “This is the best version I can produce that accounts for what you’ve told me.”
Only then do the parties make a clean decision: yes or no.

This structure prevents endless back-and-forth on positions. It forces the conversation onto what matters: what problem needs solving and what terms could plausibly solve it.

Takeaway

Negotiation jujitsu is not “being soft.” It is refusing to reward positional pressure with positional resistance.

You don’t fight their force. You redirect it — toward interests, options, and criteria.

And if that’s impossible, you change the architecture: bring in a third party and use a one-text process.

Hardball tactics: when they use dirty tricks

What if the other side lies, manipulates, or tries to throw you off balance?

Fisher & Ury treat this as a normal part of negotiation: tactics can be illegal, unethical, or simply unpleasant. The key is not to moralize — but also not to tolerate it silently.

They describe two common (and usually wrong) responses:

Absorb it. Swallow the discomfort, make concessions in “questionable” areas, and promise yourself you’ll never deal with them again. People do this hoping the other side will be satisfied and stop. Sometimes they do. Often they don’t.
Mirror it. If they anchor high, you anchor low. If they deceive, you deceive. If they threaten, you counter-threaten. This escalates, destroys reciprocity, and turns negotiation into a contest of pressure rather than merits.

Their alternative is simple in principle and hard in execution:

Hardball tactics are often a one-sided proposal about the rules of the game.
So the response is to negotiate the rules.

The three-step response: recognize → name → negotiate

Recognize the tactic.
Notice what is happening without reacting impulsively. The first win is not getting emotionally recruited into their script.
Name it and make it discussable.
Raise it explicitly as a process issue — without personal accusation. Use “I” language and describe behavior, not intent.
- “It feels like we’re using a good-cop/bad-cop routine here.”
- “This sounds like pressure rather than a standard we can justify.”
- “If authority is unclear, we should clarify mandate before we continue.”
Bringing the tactic into daylight often weakens it immediately.
Negotiate the tactic (return to principled process).
Challenge its usefulness and legitimacy, then redirect to interests, options, and objective criteria — with BATNA in the background.

The goal is not to win an argument about tactics. The goal is to restore a process that can produce a stable agreement.

Three broad classes of dirty tactics

Fisher & Ury group common moves into three categories:

1) Deliberate deception

False facts.
If you don’t have a basis for trust, don’t grant it. Verify. But avoid turning your doubt into a personal accusation (“liar”). Treat it as a factual validation problem.
Ambiguous authority (unclear mandate).
If the other side suggests they can decide — but later says “my boss must approve,” you risk negotiating twice.

Before exchanging concessions, clarify:
“What authority do you have in these negotiations?”

If authority is limited, reserve symmetry:
if their side needs review, so does yours — no “final agreement” until both approvals are in.
Dubious intentions (fear they won’t comply).
If compliance is uncertain, build enforcement into the agreement: verification steps, clear triggers, and consequences.

2) Psychological warfare

The purpose is to make you uncomfortable so you rush to end the negotiation.

Examples include: stressful environments, personal slights, status attacks, deliberate waiting, interruptions, “good cop / bad cop.”

Countermeasure: name the pattern, change conditions (time/place/break), and return to process.

3) Positional pressure tactics

These are designed to structure the situation so only one side can move.

Common ones:

refusal to negotiate (sometimes a tactic)
extreme demands / radical anchors (ask for justification and criteria)
escalating demands after each concession (pause; make the pattern explicit)
“lock-in” / “I can’t change” (face-saving pressure)
“ruthless partner” (“my partner won’t allow it”) — get confirmation; speak to the real decision-maker if possible
calculated delays (make the cost of delay explicit: “the opportunity is fading”)
“take it or leave it” / “yes or no” (treat as a tactic; keep discussing criteria and alternatives)

Threats vs warnings

Threats are easy to use and often backfire: they invite counter-threats and escalation.

When you must communicate consequences, frame them as warnings, not threats: as consequences that follow from circumstances and your need to protect your interests — not as punishment.

If the other side hears even a warning as a threat, you can reframe: “I’m not trying to punish you. I’m explaining what I’ll need to do to protect my interests if we can’t reach agreement. Do you see a better way to protect them?”

Takeaway

Hardball is not just “bad behavior.” It’s often an attempt to impose a one-sided process.

The clean response is procedural: recognize it, name it, negotiate it — and return to interests, options, and objective criteria, with BATNA as your safety line.

Closing: a framework, not a revelation

Fisher & Ury end on a slightly provocative note: the book likely contains nothing you “didn’t already know.”

The point is not novelty. The point is organizing common sense and experience into a practical framework — a repeatable way of thinking and acting. That matters because it reduces variance: you’re less dependent on mood, fatigue, or adrenaline.

They also emphasize a hard truth: reading is not training. Like sports, negotiation skill requires deliberate practice, not just intellectual agreement.

Reader Q&A: selected high-signal takeaways

Does positional bargaining ever make sense?

Yes — it’s simple, familiar, and requires little preparation. That’s why it’s common.

But it’s often costly:

it strains relationships,
it limits discovery of trades that create joint gains,
and it tends to escalate under resistance.

So the choice is a calculus: importance, complexity, relationship value, and your ability to stay regulated under pressure.

Should you ever negotiate with “bad actors”?

Their stance is pragmatic: if you don’t have a better BATNA, the question is not “whether” but how.

When not to negotiate: when your BATNA is sufficiently good and the expected value of negotiating (given risk and probability of improvement) is negative.

A recurring error (especially for institutions): overestimating how good their BATNA really is.

Communication channel matters (and can change outcomes)

They cite research suggesting that “integrative” outcomes are easier face-to-face and harder in “faceless” channels, with phone/video often in-between. Written-only negotiation tends to underperform on trust and efficiency.

Practical implications:

for difficult negotiations, prefer in-person; if remote, prefer video over phone; prefer phone/video over email/text for conflict-heavy topics;
if you must use lean channels, invest early in establishing baseline rapport before diving into substance.

References they cite include work on communication medium, trust, and negotiation outcomes.
(See: Valley, Moag & Bazerman, 1998; Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006.)¹²

First offer: not automatically optimal

It’s a mistake to treat “making the first offer” as always best.

An early offer can reduce trust or anchor the wrong frame if interests/options/criteria aren’t clarified. With strong preparation, “who goes first” becomes less important.

How high should you start (especially on price)?

Many people measure success by how far the other side moved from their initial position — psychologically satisfying, economically meaningless.

As a seller, a disciplined heuristic is:

start at the highest price you can justify without embarrassment,
ideally something you could defend as fair to a neutral third party,
avoid presenting it as immovable (hard anchoring damages credibility when you later move).

From “options” to “commitments”: finishing without self-sabotage

They recommend thinking about the end from the beginning.

Work backwards:

What would an ideal ending look like?
How could the other side explain and defend the agreement to the people they represent?
How would you defend it to yours?
What agreement allows both sides to do that?
What would it take to get there?

Keep these questions active throughout and adapt as new information arrives.

When they challenge your proposal, don’t defend — explain interests

Don’t reflexively “defend the solution.” Explain the interests it serves, then ask whether they can imagine a better way to satisfy both sets of interests.

If progress stalls, explicitly map what you disagree on — sometimes narrowing disagreement is progress.

Offers should be the natural output of the discussion

At some point you must move from exploration to offers. The point: offers should feel like a natural continuation of the interests/options/criteria work, not a random snap-back into positional trading.

Strategy follows preparation (and can’t replace it)

Good strategy tends to emerge when you’re well prepared.

Preparation checklist (compressed):

list your interests and their interests,
generate multiple options to satisfy as many interests as possible,
gather external objective criteria you could defend to a neutral observer,
plan arguments not only for the table, but for the constituencies behind each negotiator.

Limits are real — and power is not just resources

There are hard constraints. You can’t negotiate for outcomes the other side cannot rationally accept.

A clean decision rule:

if you cannot credibly offer something better than their BATNA, negotiation may be pointless.

But “power” is not just money or leverage. They argue you can increase power via:

better BATNA,
better relationships,
better communication (especially listening), because information and felt-understanding change what becomes possible.

Footnotes

K. L. Valley, J. Moag, M. H. Bazerman, “A Matter of Trust: Effects of Communication on the Efficiency and Distribution of Outcomes,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34 (1998), 211–238. ⤴
J. Nadler, D. Shestowsky, “Negotiation, Information Technology, and the Problem of the Faceless Other,” in: L. Thompson (ed.), Negotiation Theory and Research, Psychology Press (2006). ⤴